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8. Access control

The basic idea behind CM's access control is the following: In their description files, groups and libraries can specify a list of privileges that the client must have in order to be able to use them. Privileges at this level are just names (strings) and must be written in front of the initial keyword Library or Group. If one group or library imports from another group or library, then privileges (or rather: privilege requirements) are being inherited. In effect, to be able to use a program, one must have all privileges for all its libraries, sub-libraries and library components, components of sub-libraries, and so on.

Of course, this alone would not yet be satisfactory. The main service of the access control system is that it can let a client use an ``unsafe'' library ``safely''. For example, a library LSafe.cm could ``wrap'' all the unsafe operations in LUnsafe.cm with enough error checking that they become safe. Therefore, a user of LSafe.cm should not also be required to possess the privileges that would be required if one were to use LUnsafe.cm directly.

In CM's access control model it is possible for a library to ``wrap'' privileges. If a privilege $P$ has been wrapped, then the user of the library does not need to have privilege $P$ even though the library is using another library that requires privilege $P$. In essence, the library acts as a ``proxy'' who provides the necessary credentials for privilege $P$ to the sub-library.

Of course, not everybody can be allowed to establish a library with such a ``wrapped'' privilege $P$. The programmer who does that should at least herself have privilege P (but perhaps better, she should have permission to wrap $P$--a stronger requirement).

In CM, wrapping a privilege is done by specifying the name of that privilege within parenthesis. The wrapping becomes effective once the library gets stabilized via CM.stabilize. The (not yet implemented) enforcement mechanism must ensure that anyone who stabilizes a library that wraps $P$ has permission to wrap $P$.

Note that privileges cannot be wrapped at the level of CM groups.

Access control is a new feature. At the moment, only the basic mechanisms are implemented, but there is no enforcement. In other words, everybody is assumed to have every possible privilege. CM merely reports which privileges ``would have been required''.


next up previous contents
Next: 9. The pervasive environment Up: CM The SML/NJ Compilation Previous: 7.3 Explicit errors   Contents
Matthias Blume
2001-07-19