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Simplified PAK

We start with a simplified version of the PAK protocol. The idea is to do an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange, but entangle a hash of the password with the first Diffie-Hellman value sent by Alice.


 
Figure 4: Simplified PAK protocol
\begin{figure}

 {
 \begin{center}

 $\begin{array}
{lcr}
 Alice && Bob \\ 
...
 ...K = H_3(Z)
 & & K = H_3(Z) \\ 
 \end{array}$
 \end{center}
 }

\end{figure}

Details:

The intuitive reason this protocol works is that Bob can only guess one password at a time, since Bob sends his authentication value (k) first, while Alice can only guess one password at a time since she has entangled her value X with the password, and cannot compute a valid Z for any other password (by the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman problem).

However, there are some questions you may ask, like:

1.
What if Alice sends a bogus X value, like zero?
2.
What if the output of $H_1(\mbox{password})$ is not in the subgroup generated by g? Doesn't that lead to subgroup confinement attacks?

To solve these problems, we must enhance the protocol, as shown in the next section.


next up previous
Next: PAK-R Up: No Title Previous: Naive Password-Authenticated Diffie-Hellman
Phil MacKenzie
9/29/2000